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RECONFIGURING SEX, GENDER, AND THE LAW OF MARRIAGE1
Deborah A. Widiss

This article brings together legal, historical, and social science research to analyze how couples allocate income-producing and
domestic responsibilities. It develops a framework—what I call the marriage equation—that shows how sex-based classifications, (non-sex-specific) substantive marriage law, and gender norms interrelate to shape these choices. Constitutional decisions
in the 1970s ended legal distinctions between the duties of husbands and wives but left largely in place both gender norms and
substantive rights within marriage, tax, and benefits law that encourage specialization into breadwinning and caregiving roles.
By permitting disaggregation of the marriage equation, the new reality of same-sex marriage can serve as a natural experiment
that should inform both study design and policy reform.
Key Points for the Family Court Community:
• This article shows that although marriage law no longer explicitly requires wives to provide domestic support and
husbands to provide economic support, non-sex-specific aspects of the substantive law continue to encourage couples
to specialize into breadwinning and caregiving rules.
• Same-sex marriage can serve as a natural experiment to expose the extent to which substantive marriage law—as
opposed to gender norms—may encourage couples to specialize into breadwinning and caregiving roles.
• Research on same-sex marriage can help inform how best to achieve equality within all marriages and what is fair
compensation for a dependent spouse in the event of a divorce.
Keywords: marriage; divorce; same-sex marriage; gender; household labor; work/family; alimony; legal benefits

I. INTRODUCTION
“It never ceases to amaze me how many people will say to us, ‘So, who’s the woman, and who’s the man,
in your marriage?’ ”
—Jason Shumaker, husband to Paul McLoughlin II2

Traditionally, substantive marriage law aligned sex-based classifications with gender norms. They
were collectively coherent and mutually reinforcing, albeit in a way that subordinated women to men.
A husband was responsible for financially supporting his wife and a wife owed domestic services to her
husband. Divorce law included sex-based differentiation as well; for example, in many states, alimony
was available only to wives. In the 1970s, such sex-based distinctions within family law were held to be
unconstitutional. The law no longer imposes distinct responsibilities on wives and husbands. Many
might therefore assume that current marriage law encourages couples to share breadwinning and
caretaking responsibilities equally. Although it is common knowledge that husbands still typically work
more hours for pay and wives still shoulder a greater share of domestic responsibilities, this reality is
perceived to be the result of individual choices or gender norms that are outside the reach of the law.
This popular view is incorrect. In fact, marriage law and related benefits law still encourages, in a
myriad of ways, specialization within marriage into breadwinning and caregiving roles, but now it is
formally agnostic regarding which spouse plays which role. Contemporary litigation over marriage
rights for same-sex couples—that is, challenges to the last significant sex-based classifications within
marriage law—once again reconfigures marriage. The new reality of same-sex marriage does not just
advance equality for gays and lesbians; it can also offer a fresh perspective on longstanding debates
over how best to achieve equality within marriage for (different-sex and same-sex) couples and what
is fair compensation for a dependent spouse in the event of a divorce.
Correspondence: dwidiss@indiana.edu
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II. THE MARRIAGE EQUATION
When married couples make decisions regarding how they will share responsibility for incomeproducing work and domestic obligations, their choices will generally fall on a spectrum bounded at
one end by equal sharing of both responsibilities, and at the other by complete specialization. Even if
both spouses participate in the labor market, and even if they rely on paid caregivers or other domestic
workers to support this work, couples must determine what domestic obligations to “out-source,”
which spouse will perform remaining domestic work, and which spouse will modify a work schedule
when necessary to meet unexpected domestic needs. This is the negotiation that, for many couples,
occurs any time a child is too sick to go to school. Couples who choose to specialize completely into
separate breadwinning and caregiving roles, or to prioritize labor market participation by one spouse
and domestic work by the other spouse, must also determine which spouse will take on which set of
responsibilities. For any given couple, the choices may shift over time, or even vary dramatically on
a daily or weekly basis. But their choices are shaped, and sometimes constrained, by societal gender
norms and by substantive marriage law, including both any sex-specific obligations that are imposed
on husbands or wives and non-sex-specific structures that can encourage specialization into caregiving
and breadwinning roles or, conversely, equal sharing of such responsibilities.
These three factors—sex-based classifications within marriage law, gender norms, and non-sexspecific substantive laws of marriage—collectively form what I call a “marriage equation.” Although
these factors are logically distinct, they interrelate. Any individual couple’s choices will be shaped by
all three factors, the extent to which the factors reinforce or are in tension with each other, and the
couple’s assessment of each factor’s importance. They also relate in a more general sense, in that laws
both reflect and shape societal norms in complex ways that are difficult to disentangle. As applied
to marriage law, there have been dramatic debates, over time, regarding whether there is a single
“optimal” division of responsibilities within marriage; if so, what it is; and further, whether and how
the law should encourage or enforce it. In this essay, I am not arguing that any particular allocation is
ideal. Rather, I am using the marriage equation framework to articulate more clearly the interaction of
these factors and to demonstrate how empirical work can help disaggregate their distinct effects.

III. THE MARRIAGE EQUATION FOR DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES
Historically, marriage was only available to different-sex couples, and the three factors of the
marriage equation collectively expressed and enforced as ideal a marriage in which the husband took
on primary or full breadwinning responsibilities and the wife took on primary or full caretaking
responsibilities. Long after the demise of coverture, in which a woman’s legal identity was subsumed
under her husband upon marriage, family law used explicit sex-based classifications to impose distinct
responsibilities on husbands to provide financial support and on wives to provide domestic services.3
Employment laws further reinforced this division, permitting, for example, employers to pay married
men more than women performing the same work, in recognition of men’s presumed responsibilities
to provide for a family.4 (As Henry Ford explained in 1922 when doubling the salary paid to married
men, “The man does the work in the shop, but the wife does the work at home. The shop must pay
them both.”5) The government programs of social insurance, largely developed during the 1930s
through the 1950s, likewise used sex-based classifications to meet the needs of this idealized family
structure. Upon death or retirement of a spouse, dependent wives, but not husbands, could receive
social security benefits, and unemployment insurance provided protection for children of out-of-work
fathers but not out-of-work mothers.6 Private employment benefits—such as the availability of health
insurance for an employee and his spouse and children—facilitated this divide as well. These legal
rights were complementary to, and strengthened by, societal norms as expressed in the ideology of
separate spheres: men should express and prove their masculinity by shouldering the breadwinning
responsibilities, and women should express and prove their femininity by providing nurturing care and
support.
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A. THE DEMISE OF (MOST) SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS

In the 1960s and 1970s, the women’s movement challenged the legality of sex-based classifications
within the marriage equation, as well as the separate spheres ideology that underlay it. Explicit sex
discrimination in employment was prohibited by the enactment of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title
VII of the Civil Rights of 1964.7 In the 1970s, a series of groundbreaking Supreme Court decisions
(many litigated by now-Justice-then-ACLU-lawyer Ruth Bader Ginsburg) held that sex-based distinctions within family law were generally unconstitutional.8 Congress and state legislatures subsequently stripped most sex-based classifications from family, employment, and benefits law.
These developments changed the marriage equation by removing explicit sex-based classifications
(other than the threshold requirement that a man must marry a woman). But they largely left in place
the pre-existing architecture of substantive marriage and related benefits law that encourages specialization. Gender norms also changed far less than feminists had expected. Thus, the modified marriage
equation left by these legal developments—the equation that persists to this day—does not actually
encourage couples to share domestic and income-producing responsibilities equally. Rather, even
though the equation no longer explicitly requires husbands and wives to play distinct roles, the
combination of substantive marriage law and gender norms still encourages specialization along
gendered lines.

B. SUBSTANTIVE MARRIAGE LAW AND GENDER NORMS CONTINUE TO COLLECTIVELY
ENCOURAGE SPECIALIZATION

More than 30 years after explicit sex-based classifications in family, employment, and benefits law
were held to violate the Constitution or statutory prohibitions on discrimination, the vast majority of
different-sex couples still divide responsibilities along gendered lines. Although women now typically
share breadwinning responsibility, with 70% of married women with children under 18 participating
in the paid labor force,9 they still perform far more housework than married men. In 1965, married
women spent about seven times as many hours as their husbands on housework; now married women
spend about twice as many hours as their husbands on housework.10 Women working full time also still
generally do more childcare than their husbands, although some recent studies suggest that this
imbalance is narrowing considerably, particularly among younger men.11 These facts collectively give
rise to the reality that Arlie Hochschild has famously described as the “second shift.”12 Women work
significant hours outside the home and then return to significant childcare and housework responsibilities at home. Labor force participation and housework division are only part of the story. Working
mothers are far more likely than working fathers to miss work for children’s illnesses or when
childcare arrangements break down. They are also more likely to forego or transition out of timeintensive or travel-intensive careers when children are born.13
A large body of quantitative and qualitative work by social scientists seeks to explain the persistence and pervasiveness of the gendered allocation of breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities.
One prominent theory, initially propounded by Gary Becker, focuses on the efficiencies provided
by specialization.14 Becker argued that households, like companies, benefit from a certain level of
specialization, and that the aggregate household’s well-being will be maximized if one spouse
specializes in paid work and the other specializes in caretaking.15 Other economists postulate that the
spouse with greater earning power, still typically the man, will use his extra earning power to “bargain
out” of housework.16 However, several studies have shown that women who earn more than their
husbands often still perform a greater share of housework than their husbands. Even more surprisingly, as the gap in their earnings widens, the gap in the housework split also tends to widen.17 In other
words, a woman who far out-earns her husband will tend to do a considerably larger share of the
housework than a woman who earns about the same amount as her husband. Social scientists speculate
that in relationships in which the woman earns more than the man, both individuals “correct” for the
“gender deviance” implicit in their allocation of breadwinning responsibilities by embracing a traditional gendered split regarding household responsibilities.
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But gender norms, and what might be characterized as sex-neutral economic factors (which owe
much to the historic separate spheres ideology), are not the full story. Substantive marriage law, and
tax and benefits laws that incorporate marriage into their structure, also continue to encourage
specialization into breadwinning and caregiving roles. For example, in the upper tax brackets, federal
tax law imposes a “marriage penalty” on married couples who earn relatively comparable amounts,
and it provides a “marriage bonus” for couples with a significant disparity in earnings.18 Additionally,
if both members of the couple work outside the home, they pay taxes on the income they earn,
including income used to purchase childcare services (other than a limited deduction) or assistance
with housework. By contrast, if one member of the couple stays home and provides childcare or
housework services himself or herself, the couple pays no tax on the imputed value of such services,
further increasing the marriage “bonus” for couples with such specialization.19 Social security subsidizes caretaking by permitting dependent spouses (formerly explicitly dependent wives) who have
not engaged in paid work, and thus have not paid into the social security system at all, to receive
benefits based on a spouse’s contributions, in addition to the benefits the working spouse receives
himself or herself.20
Although having one spouse opt out of the paid labor market is often conceived of as a “luxury”
for the middle class or upper class, two of the most significant government assistance programs for
low-income families also encourage a breadwinner-caretaker divide. Welfare law imposes a collective
hourly work requirement on two-parent families that is only slightly higher than the requirement
applied to single-parent families,21 and the Earned Income Tax Credit uses identical or almost
identical eligibility standards for single-parent households and dual-parent households.22 Although the
vast majority of families served by these programs are single-parent (mostly single-mother) families,
married parents who qualify for benefits will typically be well served by specializing into breadwinning and caregiving roles because the value of childcare provided by a parent is not imputed as
income, and a second wage income could easily push a family over the eligibility thresholds.23
The gendered architecture of marriage law also persists—to some extent—in the protections that
it provides to a dependent spouse if the relationship comes to an end. In most states, courts have the
power to “equitably divide” property acquired during a marriage, regardless of title, and also to order
a primary breadwinner to make maintenance or alimony payments to a former spouse after divorce.
When resolving disputes over property or spousal support, courts are typically required to consider
factors such as the extent to which one spouse has provided care for children or has facilitated the
other spouse’s wage-earning, as well as the relative ability of the spouses to support themselves.24
Even though the vast majority of property settlements in divorces are ultimately resolved through
private negotiations, dependent spouses, negotiating in the “shadow of the law,” can use these
substantive entitlements to strengthen their position.25
Marriage law provides only a partial safety net for a dependent spouse, but it is far greater
protection than a dependent cohabitor receives. No court needs to be involved when a cohabiting
relationship ends and, if courts do become involved, the legal default is that each individual member
of the couple leaves the relationship with the income she earned and any property such income was
used to acquire. In other words, a dependent cohabitor who drops out of the workplace to provide
domestic support might well have no claim to property or income accumulated by her partner. Even
if a dependent cohabitor has the foresight, resources, and bargaining power to contract explicitly with
a partner for financial recompense if the relationship unravels, she or he may have no legal recourse
because courts in some states refuse to enforce even express contracts between cohabitors.26
Beyond these incentives embedded in the law of marriage, societal and personal understandings of
marriage likewise encourage many couples to specialize. A decision to marry is a statement from each
member of a couple that they intend to remain in the relationship, ideally for life. Marriage naturally
encourages a shift from an individualized focus to a family-based focus for decision making, permitting
couples to take advantage of complementary skill sets or interests, or to subordinate immediate interests
of one or both members of the couple for expected collective long-term gain. Studies have shown
that actual legal rights are an important part of this calculus. For example, several studies have found
(somewhat surprisingly) that couples are sufficiently aware of divorce law that changes in the
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substantive law—such as greater or lesser protections for a dependent spouse—affect bargaining
between spouses and the willingness to invest in marriage-specific capital.27 Exactly how big a role legal
rights play is hard to calculate, especially since for different-sex couples these legal incentives align with
strong gender norms that also persist. Same-sex marriage can help disaggregate these factors.

IV. THE MARRIAGE EQUATION FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
A rapidly growing number of states either permit same-sex couples to marry or have created a
status, such as a civil union or domestic partnership, that provides all of the state-level legal benefits
of marriage.28 Even before New York legalized same-sex marriage in the summer of 2011, researchers
estimated that approximately 50,000 same-sex couples in this country had married, and that another
85,000 same-sex couples had entered into civil unions or domestic partnerships.29 The marriage
equation operates differently for same-sex couples than different-sex couples. As described above, for
different-sex couples, gender norms work together with substantive marriage law to encourage
specialization. For same-sex couples, by contrast, a decision to specialize into breadwinning or
caregiving roles means that at least one member of the couple is going “against” gender norms.
Accordingly, same-sex marriage can serve as a natural experiment to pull apart the marriage equation
to better understand the relative significance of each factor in how couples make decisions.
A. STUDIES OF GAY AND LESBIAN COUPLES THAT PREDATE MARRIAGE

Several studies of lesbian and gay couples using data that predate legal marriage found that
same-sex couples divide housework and parenting responsibilities much more equally than differentsex couples.30 As one researcher put it, “Although members of gay and lesbian couples do not divide
household labor in a perfectly equal manner, they are more likely than members of heterosexual
couples to negotiate a balance between achieving a fair distribution of household labor and accommodating the different interests, skills, and work schedules of particular partners.”31 For example, a
detailed study of same-sex couples who had formed civil unions in Vermont found that same-sex
couples with significantly different incomes not only divided housework more equally than differentsex couples with significantly different incomes, but also more equally than different-sex couples with
similar incomes.32 Studies of gay and lesbian parents likewise find that they share childcare responsibilities considerably more equally than different-sex parents.33 Although studies document that some
gay and lesbian couples do specialize into breadwinning and caregiving roles,34 the vast majority of
research suggests that both the ideal and the typical experience is relatively equal sharing.35
Citing such findings, some academic researchers and writers in the popular press have suggested
that gay and lesbian couples may be a model for different-sex couples struggling to equalize home and
work responsibilities.36 There is potential here, but it may be illusory. These claims overlook a key
factor: the studies compare heterosexual married couples to same-sex couples in (non-marital)
long-term relationships. These differ in two significant ways. The first, and the one that has been the
focus of the studies, is obviously whether the members of the couple are of the same or different sexes.
The second distinction is whether or not the couple is legally married. This latter factor is rarely
considered significant in study design, and is often entirely ignored, but it could be quite important.
B. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AS A NATURAL EXPERIMENT TO DISAGGREGATE THE
MARRIAGE EQUATION

Nine jurisdictions currently permit same-sex couples to marry, thus removing the last significant
sex-based classification from marriage law. Same-sex married couples around the country are now
deciding: Will one husband drop out of the paid workforce to stay home with children while the other
husband provides income? Will one wife focus on advancing her career while the other wife provides
domestic support? The choices these couples make may well be different from those made by
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same-sex unmarried couples because, as discussed above, substantive marriage law and related
benefits laws both encourage couples to specialize into breadwinning and caregiving roles and offer
at least some protection to dependent spouses if the relationship ends. Societal understandings of what
marriage means, and the personal significance of making a formal long-term commitment to a partner,
can likewise encourage specialization.
Same-sex marriage can thus serve as a natural experiment that disaggregates the marriage equation. There are at least two fruitful lines of study. One could compare labor allocation in married
same-sex couples to labor allocation in cohabiting same-sex couples. Similar studies have found, as
the analysis above suggests, that married heterosexual couples tend to specialize into breadwinning
and caretaking roles more than cohabiting heterosexual couples. But researchers have long recognized
that these studies may be distorted by a selection bias, in that different-sex couples who choose not to
marry may do so in part because they seek greater autonomy. Same-sex couples, by contrast, often
cannot marry because they are not permitted to under state law. This reality creates a natural “control”
group that can mitigate selection bias—albeit, I believe, at the cost of fundamental civil rights.37
Studies could also compare same-sex and different-sex married couples to explore the relative
importance of marriage, as opposed to gender, in the choices couples make. Importantly, it is not (yet)
possible to fully compare same-sex married couples to different-sex married couples because the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) denies same-sex couples the many federal benefits of
marriage.38 This means, among other things, that a same-sex couple cannot file their federal taxes as
a married couple, is not eligible for Social Security spousal benefits, and cannot sponsor a spouse for
immigration status. Additionally, while some states permit same-sex couples to marry, others have
created alternative statuses such as civil unions or domestic partnerships that provide the rights and
benefits of marriage but arguably less of the expressive value of marriage. As a matter of constitutional
law and fundamental fairness, I believe same-sex couples in any state should have the freedom to
marry. The current variability, however, offers the opportunity to design research that assesses the
relative importance of state versus federal benefits of marriage and to delve down into the differences
between the symbolic and substantive rights of marriage.

V. RECONSIDERING EQUALITY
A better understanding of the marriage equation could yield significant benefits. Consider, for
example, debates over alimony reform. Before the 1970s, in many states alimony was sex-specific.
It was generally limited to “innocent” wives whose divorces were granted upon a finding that their
husbands were at fault, and thus continued the sex-specific requirement that husbands provide
economic support to their wives within marriage. In the 1970s, alimony changed in two respects. First,
under evolving understandings of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection, alimony could
no longer be limited to dependent wives. But rather than simply making alimony sex-neutral, many
states followed the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and replaced open-ended alimony with
“maintenance,” generally short-term support provided to dependent spouses who are deemed unable
to support themselves while they prepare to re-enter the paid workplace.39 These reforms fit comfortably with the 1970s feminists’ efforts to remake marriage as a union of “equals.”
If gender roles had been restructured, and if other aspects of substantive marriage law that
encourage specialization during the duration of the marriage had also been retooled, and particularly
if other supports (such as publically-subsidized childcare, more generous parental leaves, or greater
workplace flexibility) had been established such that women routinely participated in paid work on an
equal basis with their husbands, these alimony reforms might have been considered both successful
and fair. That did not happen. Rather, as discussed above, women continue to provide the bulk of
caregiving within different-sex marriages; they are far more likely than men to drop out of the paid
workforce entirely, to work part-time, or, even if working full-time, to prioritize caregiving over taking
full advantage of their earning power. Although equitable distribution of marital property can partially
compensate for such realities, many divorcing couples have very little marital property; their greatest
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asset is often the primary wage-earner’s income. Additionally, upon divorce, women are far more
likely than men to be granted sole or primary physical custody of children, and accordingly family
responsibilities continue to compromise their ability to maximize their wage-earning potential. The
combined effect of these various factors means that, not surprisingly, women’s standard of living after
divorce often falls dramatically, while men’s typically declines modestly or even improves.40
Changing one aspect of the marriage equation (sex-based open-ended alimony eligibility)
without changing others (gender norms that expect women to be primary caretakers and tax, benefit,
and other substantive marriage laws that encourage specialization) upsets the previous balance.
Divorced women, as a group, are probably not worse off under the current regime than they would
have been under the prior alimony regime, but they certainly did not benefit as much as they might
have from other reform approaches that more accurately gauged, or accepted, the competing incentives embedded in the marriage equation.
The potential that same-sex marriage offers to better understand the extent to which marriage law
itself may encourage specialization can dramatically change the conversation regarding whether and
how to compensate a dependent spouse in the event of divorce. It will be many years before we have
a sufficient body of data, and analysis of such data, to make credible statements regarding general
patterns. That said, broadly speaking, two potential findings may emerge. One is that, notwithstanding
marriage, same-sex couples continue to share responsibilities on the home and work front relatively
equally. This would suggest that gender norms are the key factor in different-sex couples’ specialization, and that current reform efforts centered on reshaping or accommodating gender norms are the
appropriate mechanism to address the ongoing imbalance.
The other potential result is that upon being permitted to marry—particularly if DOMA is repealed
or overturned—same-sex married couples will begin to specialize just as different-sex couples do.
Such findings would help isolate the role that marriage law, along with personal and societal understandings of marriage, plays in the choices couples make. Such findings could expose a disconnect in
a structure of marriage law that encourages specialization during marriage but that, upon divorce,
treats such specialization as an individual choice for which the dependent spouse must bear the brunt
of the consequences.
If one embraces a normative ideal of marriage as a partnership in which spouses equally share
responsibilities for breadwinning and caretaking, such findings would suggest that reforms should
focus on modifying or, more provocatively, dismantling the law and benefits that flow from marriage
itself. Some might argue, however, that the advent of same-sex marriage also invites reconsideration of
the normative vision of equality within marriage. Perhaps, rather than idealizing a marriage in which
both spouses equally share breadwinning and caregiving responsibilities, it is appropriate to accept and
expect a certain level of specialization in many marriages. Such an approach would call for more robust
protections for a spouse who does such caregiving and more flexible workplace policies to accommodate it. In the past, it would have been almost impossible to disaggregate such a statement from
gender-based assumptions regarding which parent would play the caretaking role. And some policymakers and theorists would likely reject such a vision of equality out-of-hand because they assume that
it would perpetuate the inferiority and subordination of women. This is a valid concern. Domestic roles
are still little valued in our society and are still largely filled by women. However, policies crafted today
or in the future to accommodate caregiving within families are necessarily different from the sexspecific responsibilities of wives that they replace. The simple reality of same-sex married couples, as
well as the relatively small number of different-sex couples in which it is the husband, rather than the
wife, who drops out of or minimizes participation in the paid workplace, changes the story.
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